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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2034  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [ETTC](#) [TY](#) [IR](#)  
SUBJECT: SHIELD S19-09: IRAN SEEKS CHEMICAL WEAPONS  
PRECURSOR FROM TURKISH FIRM

REF: A. 08 PARIS 735  
[1](#)B. 07 PARIS 2601

Classified By: Classified By: Tina Kaidanow, DAS, EUR/FO  
Reasons 1.4 (c) and (d)

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.

[1](#)2. (S//NF) BACKGROUND: The U.S. has obtained information indicating that Iran's Raja Shimi Industrial Factories is seeking the Australia Group (AG) controlled chemical weapons (CW) precursor dimethylamine (DMA) from the Turkish firm Ak Kim Kimya. As a respected AG member, the GOT will understand the significant proliferation potential posed by supplying Raja Shimi with AG-controlled chemicals, such as DMA. Raja Shimi's production capabilities and its role in Iran's suspected CW program have been key discussion topics at several past AG meetings (reftels). Therefore, we would like to alert the GOT to Ak Kim Kimya's dealings with Raja Shimi and urge the GOT to prevent the transfer of AG-controlled chemicals to Iran. We would also like to inform the GOT about domestic legal obligations that may require us to report any transaction between Ak Kim Kimya and Iran to Congress. END BACKGROUND.

[1](#)3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests that Post deliver the points in paragraph 4 to appropriate host government officials and report a response. The points may be left as a non-paper.

[1](#)4. (SBU) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL TURKEY)

-- In the spirit of our nonproliferation cooperation, we would like to raise a matter of chemical weapons (CW) proliferation concern and request the Government of Turkey's assistance in investigating the following activity.

-- We have information that the Iranian entity Raja Shimi Industry Factories is seeking to purchase Australia Group (AG) controlled dimethylamine (DMA) from the Turkish company Ak Kim Kimya Sanaya ve Ticaret A.S.

-- The address for Ak-Kim Kimya is Suleyman Seba Cad. Acisu Sok Taslik, Apartment Number 13, 34357, Macka, Istanbul, Turkey.

-- Although it has legitimate civilian uses, dimethylamine can also be used as a chemical precursor for the nerve agent Tabun, which is why the chemical is on the Australia Group's control list of chemical weapons precursors.

-- As you know, in its Chemical Weapons Convention Schedule 3 declaration, Iran identified Raja Shimi as a chemical production facility owned by the Iranian Defense Ministry.

-- We are concerned that this precursor could be intended for, or diverted to, Iran's chemical weapons program.

-- We also want to alert you that the United States, Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) requires us to provide periodic reports to the U.S. Congress identifying persons (including individuals and entities) who have transferred to, or acquired from, Iran, North Korea, and Syria certain items of proliferation concern, including items that are on the Australia Group's lists.

-- We appreciate our continued close nonproliferation cooperation, and would appreciate any information the Turkish Government could share regarding this matter.

End talking points/non-paper.

15. (S//NF) Please begin all responses with SHIELD S19-09 and slug for ISN.

17. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance.  
CLINTON